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Summary
The paper examines the circumstances in which a small gold mining company
(Union Mining NL) was issued with an s29 notification for a future act by the
Queensland State Government during 1997. What is remarkable about this case
is first, that apart from s29 notifications for Century Zinc Limited's (CZL) Century
mine, Union Mining NL is the only other mining company in Queensland to have
been issued with such a notification to date; second, Union Mining NL was not
operating an enterprise of the size of Century mine and therefore represents
another, and different dimension of the resource extractive industry; finally.
Union Mining NL's gold mine at Georgetown eventually closed, despite positive
negotiations with the claimant group within the right to negotiate process. In the
company's assessment, the Georgetown closure was not a consequence of native
title as a development risk, but flowed from inefficient and untimely
administrative and decision-making processes of the State Government.
The research concludes that in relation to the native title process in
Queensland:
• these processes have been under utilised, apart from two exceptional cases
(CZL and Union Mining NL);
• that the Queensland Cabinet granted Union Mining NLan s29 notification
as a 'test case' only;
• that post-Wik, the Queensland Government's present administrative freeze
on issues of new leases is tacit acknowledgment of the development risk
now faced by the mining and pastoral industries from the issue of 800
potentially invalid leases;
• that Queensland State Government bureaucrats and politicians actively
discouraged industry from applying the future act processes and cited the
experience of Western Australia as illustrative of the damage to industry
from the future act process;
• that the Queensland Government's political strategy of ignoring the native
title future act processes has, ultimately, not been pragmatic. Nor did it
follow the example of States like Western Australia where the majority of
s29 notices proceed without objections;
• that the delays of the Queensland Government to issue Union Mining NL
with an s29 notice, combined with the administrative embargo on grants of
new leases or conversions from exploration to mining tenements, eventually
made it economically necessary to close the mine with a loss of 40 jobs.
• that native title claimants must appreciate that the mining industry is not a
homogenous body, but supports a range of industry types from small,
individual 'tin scratchers', to multinational companies operating in a global
economy. This means that packages negotiated between mining companies
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and native title claimants will need to realistically assess what is possible
and reasonable for the industry body.
The research recommends:
• that in order to facilitate industry development especially in mining. State
Governments need to engage with native title processes in a timely and
administratively efficient manner across all sectors of the mining industry;
• that the mining industry is increasingly apprehensive about the capacity of
governments to support industry development, not least because of the kind
of political strategies currently used to deal with native title issues;
• that more attention be paid to comparative situations (such as that between
Queensland and Western Australia) for assessments of how State
Governments might pragmatically respond to native title and mitigate
development risks for industry;
• that regional framework and project agreements may have the potential to
facilitate the interests of both native title claimants and industry bodies over
future act matters. A current example of such arrangements is the Far West
Coast Working Group in South Australia. The agreement involves 14 mining
companies and several native title groups with the objective of establishing
work and site clearance protocols for minerals exploration as well as
decision-making processes about what level of activity can occur in specific
areas covered by the agreement;
• that for all parties (government, industry and indigenous groups) there are
strategic advantages to be gained from being familiar with native title
legislation.
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Introduction
Until the High Court's decision of December 1996 in the Wik Peoples v
Queensland many State Governments operated on the principle that pastoral
leases extinguished native title. There seemed to be little anticipation of the
potential for coexistence of native title on pastoral leases; although in Western
Australia, the State Government has, since March 1995, consistently issued s29
future act notices (notices of future government actions) to accommodate the
activity of the mining industry and to ensure issue of valid leases.
Overnight, the Wikjudgement revised previously held assumptions amongst
some stakeholders about what constituted a 'permissible future act', where it
applied and when it attracted the right to negotiate (RTN) process. The impact of
the Wik case was to reopen questions about future act procedures and the right
to negotiate in relation to pastoral activities; not simply in relation to the mining
industry.
Only two s29 notifications have been issued in Queensland to date; one set
of notices to Century Zinc Limited (CZL) for Century Mine and the other, to Union
Mining NL for their Georgetown mine. Despite the reluctance of successive
Queensland State Governments over issuing s29 notices the Century Mine has
now gone ahead. By contrast, Union Mining's operation at Georgetown has closed.
This paper concentrates on the situation of Union Mining as a small mining
company with an application for the grant of a number of mining leases over a
pastoral property in northern Queensland in the post-Wik climate. The case first
came to my attention when Union Mining NL's Managing Director, Rob Murdoch,
addressed a conference in Brisbane, Working with the Native Title Act, in June
1997. I was intrigued by the company's experience; first, because they had
managed to get an s29 notification issued from the Queensland Government and
second, despite the notification, they had closed down their operation. Why were
the situations of Union Mining NLand CZL so different in outcome?
Several lessons are to drawn from the case study. Much of the literature
describing the negotiations between mining companies and Aboriginal
communities on Aboriginal land under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 has dealt with relationships with large, often multinational
companies. By comparison, the situation for various categories of mining under
the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) is less well known, especially when agreements
reached so far are subject to confidentiality. What is apparent is that a notion of
economies of scale will need consideration when negotiating the financial aspects
of agreements; and second, that the RTN process (as it currently stands) will have
differential impacts on and transaction costs for different kinds of resource
developers, not least because of the variation in resource extraction methods and
hence the nature of the enterprise (Altman 1995).
Proposed amendments to the NTA currently include limitations and
exemptions to native title claimants' RTNa range of future acts over land under
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claim (Smith 1996). For indigenous groups this proposal remains a contested
issue (see ATSIC 1996; 1997); although it is an option championed by many
industry groups (Industry Commission 1996: 218-26). Since mining tenements
and exploration licenses are frequently issued over pastoral leases, charges of
'uncertainty' and 'unworkability' with respect to the native title process have been
frequently made from both resource developmentindustries and pastoralists. In
particular, pastoralists appear consumed by questions about what activities can
be undertaken on their leases without invoking the future act procedures and the
RTN process (see National Farmers Federation 1997).
The RTN process in Queensland
Since the introduction of the NTA, the Queensland Government has issued only
eight s29 notices of intention to do a future act over land where native title exists
or it is claimed to exist, and where the RTNapplies. Seven of these notifications
related to mining leases and compulsory acquisitions to do with the
establishment of the mine proposed by CZL in north-west Queensland. The other
notice related to the grant of mining leases to Union Mining NL, a small gold
mining venture employing 40 people on their Georgetown mining site.
How and why did a relatively unknown company succeed in gaining this
notification, given that s29 notices in Queensland are only issued with the
approval of Cabinet? The story of what occurred and its aftermath forms the
context of this discussion paper about the Queensland Government's strategic
behaviour with respect to the RTN processes.
The background
In the period immediately following the High Court's Wik decision, the
Queensland Government put an administrative freeze on the processing of all
current and future exploration licences and mining leases. In part, this was a
response to its earlier presumption that pastoral leases did extinguish native title
and the Queensland Government's subsequent decision to issue licences and
leases without engaging in the future act procedures laid down under the NTA. As
a result of this position between January 1994 and the Wik judgement of
December 1996, the Queensland Government issued 800 potentially invalid
leases. The administrative freeze represented a strategic political response to
reassess the State's position in relation to the now potentially invalid leases and
the ensuing uncertainty felt from major sectors of the Queensland economy,
namely pastoralists and miners.
Union Mining NL was caught up in the political decision to enforce an
administrative freeze on the further issue or renewal of applications for mining
grants. Their operation at Georgetown, west of Cairns, consisted of processing
plants and earthmoving equipment to deal with the site-specific bodies of ore the
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company were sequentially mining as each deposit was worked out.The majority
of the ore deposits were held within exploration licences and these were being
progressively upgraded to a grant of a mining tenement prior to extraction. This
meant that a new mining tenement lease was required for each ore deposit.
Usually the upgrade was applied for 18 months in advance of the need on the
assumption of a six-month progression through the State bureaucracy. Most of
the Georgetown exploration licences had been issued over pastoral land.
At the time of the Queensland administrative freeze, Union Mining NL had
several applications for changeovers from exploration licenses to grants of mining
tenements, with 16 mining lease applications moving through different stages in
the Queensland Department of Mines and Energy's (DME) administrative system.
Post-Wik, any decisions to grant a mining lease would now be encumbered by the
additional considerations of the coexistence issue and attract the RTN process.
To appreciate the finer details of the Union Mining NL story, it is worth
recapping the future act process for mining and exploration activities; mindful
that these processes are currently subject to the proposed bill of amendments to
the NTA introduced in the Federal Parliament in the first week of September
1997.
The NTA encompasses a range of future acts (ss226, 227 and 233) including
a specific category of 'permissible future acts' (s235) akin to acts which can be
carried out on freehold land. However, native title claimants and holders have a
statutory right to negotiate over certain permissible future acts before they can
legally take place. Permissible future acts which attract the RTN include the
following (s26(2)):
• the creation or variation of a right to mine, including exploration,
prospecting and quarrying (s253);
• the variation and extension of the period of a mining right, except where the
variation or extension is a legally enforceable right; and
• the compulsory acquisition by government of native title land where the
purpose is to transfer rights or interests to a party other than government
(Smith 1996: 1-2).
As the legislation currently stands, when government believes land over
which there may be a native title interest is affected by a proposal to issue a 'right
to explore for minerals, or to grant, vary or extend a right to mine, then the
government must advertise the proposed future act and give two months notice
to:
• Any native title holders ('native title parties');
• Any registered native title claimants ('native title parties');
• Any representative Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander body in relation to
the area of the land or waters affected by the proposed grant;
• State or National Native Title Tribunal, acting as an arbitral body; and
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• The miner or mineral explorer ('grantee party') seeking to benefit from the
future act (National Native Title Tribunal [NNTT] 1995: 50).
No right to negotiate currently operates in an unopposed non-claimant
future act notice; in off-shore areas; or where renewal of a licence or lease is a
legally enforceable right (Smith 1996: 2).
Provided there is no response from the native title holders or any native title
claimants within the two month notification period, then mining or exploration
can proceed. It is worth remembering that the two month period of the s29 notice
is the only window of opportunity for native title parties to secure the RTN since
no retroactive right can be sought (Smith 1996: 3). Native title claimants or
holders can only attract the RTN process when they have a claim registered with
the NNTT. This also means that unless an overlapping claim is lodged during the
two month period after the issue of the s29 notice then no extra burden of
additional native title parties in negotiations is entailed for the mining company.
In some cases, the proposed activities can be fast-tracked through an
'expedited procedure' and other mechanisms provided for under the NTA (see
Altman 1995: 6). If the expedited procedure does not apply then negotiations
begin between the Government, native title parties and the grantee party.
However, Government can signal that it is seeking to attract the 'expedited
procedure' when notice of an s29 future act is publicly advertised. The grounds
on which an 'expedited procedure' would be invoked are situations where the
permissible future act does not 'involve major disturbance to any land or waters,
and does not directly interfere with any community life or sites of particular
significance to the native title holders or claimants (s237). ... The majority of
future acts for which governments are currently seeking to attract the expedited
procedure are exploration and prospecting licences' (Smith 1996: 3). The
expedited procedure does not entail a 'full-blown right to negotiate' (Smith 1996:
3).
The expedited process is not discussed in this paper because in the case of
Union Mining NL they were specifically seeking a grant of the right to mine, not
exploration or prospecting licences. They were seeking an upgrade of 16 of their
ore deposits from exploration licence to mining leases. Union Mining requires a
separate mining lease for each body of ore and at least 10 leases a year are
needed for project viability. The company maintain that it was not financially
feasible for them to secure a whole-of-area grant of lease to mine because the area
involved would be larger than permissible under a single mining lease.
The public advertisement of a Government's intention to engage in a future
act requires that Government enable parties to make submissions to it (either
orally or in writing) about the proposed mining activity, and importantly, to
negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement with the other parties. The
negotiation period extends, from the date the notice was first advertised, for four
months (for proposed mineral exploration) and six months (for proposed mining).
It is not mandatory for the NNTT to be involved in negotiations. However, at any
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point in the negotiation phase any one of the parties can invite the NNTT to act as
a mediator to assist in reaching an agreement. If no agreement is reached after six
months of negotiation for a mining future act,then the matter is subject to an
arbitrated determination by the NNTT.
Union Mining NL at Georgetown
The story of Union Mining NL's experience at Georgetown raises important
questions about how grantee parties access legitimate and effective processes
under the native title legislation. For Union Mining NL'soperation at Georgetown
this was not simply a question of procedural knowledge, but was increasingly a
matter determined by the political strategy of the State Government.
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to infer that the Union Mining NL
experience is wholly a misadventure due to the workings of either the Wik
judgement or the particulars of the native title legislation. For resource
exploration and resource developers like Union Mining NL, decisions about the
company's future necessarily involve a constant assessment of risk factors to do
with the legislative conditions impinging on their operation (such as native title
legislation, and mining and environment rehabilitation requirements) and current
market trends (such as the fall in gold prices and the diminished profitability of
forward selling during 1997). It is the combination of all these factors which
determines their economic viability and their future direction.
When Union Mining NL began in Georgetown in 1994 it was simply a
processing plant to extract gold from ore deposits from 'a number of satellite
mining operations within a 50 kilometre radius of the plant' (Union Mining NL
1996: 6). Over three years, 30 separate deposits were mined as open cuts and the
landscape rehabilitated. By 1996, the success of the Georgetown operation had
expanded to 'undertake the mining operation itself in order to maximise the grade
and minimise the dilution' (Union Mining NL 1996: 6). Initially, the life expectancy
of the Georgetown mining operation was six years, although the acquisition of
additional crushing plants and earth moving machinery suggested the potential
for an extended life as an ancillary operation. 'Acquisition of other gold resources
in the area, and possible mining and carting of the Croydon gold resources
enhanced mine life to a possible 10 years' (Union Mining NL 1996: 19). A
feasibility study was conducted in 1996 to assess the viability of carting ore from
Croydon to the Georgetown plant. However, carting ore from Croydon to
Georgetown was not undertaken in 1997as the company felt that DME's
requirements with respect to approving the Environmental Management Overview
Strategy for this project were too onerous for this to be an economical and viable
alternative at that time.
As a small gold mining operation, Georgetown's continued operation was
dependent on the periodic granting of leases for the mining of identified deposits
in the vicinity of the processing plant. Given the dispersal of the ore deposits from
the plant, the most economically feasible strategy for the company was to
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maintain exploration interests over the deposits and upgrade these when needed.
As Altman (1995: 3) has noted, in general, the differentiation between exploration
and production phases of resource development for mining companies and the
petroleum industry mean the native title process is likely to impact differentially
across extractive industries like petroleum and mining.
In such a staged process, time is a prime commodity in maintaining
economic viability. But in the post-Wik political climate of Queensland politics,
the question of how to effectively engage the state's administrative system with
the procedural requirements of the native title legislation in order to engage in a
permissible future act,and therefore maintain production, became a dominant
concern of the company. Inevitably a management decision was made of the
assessment of the risk factors. The company's Quarterly Report for March 1997
carries this statement. The lack of a continuous flow of mining leases as a result
of the High Court Wik Decision following Queensland Department of Mines and
Energy delays in 1996,compounded by lower gold prices, has resulted in
difficulties in the long term running the Georgetown Operation. The Georgetown
type of operation is not suited to either current Department policies or to the
implementation of the Native Title Act as it currently exists' (Union MiningNL
1997: 1).
The s29 notification process in Queensland
The State's position
Post-Wik, the Queensland State Government decided that any issue of a s29
future act notification would first require Cabinet approval. This is not necessarily
the path adopted by other States. Western Australia has a high level of industry
interest in exploration and mining, but since March 1995 and its failed challenge
to the validity of the NTA legislation in the High Court, they decided to 'issue
future mining titles only after an assessment of the possibility that native title
continued to exist' (NNTT 1995: 52). ' But 'in any case where native title remained
a possibility, the future act regime would be used' (NNTT 1995: 52).
In South Australia, the State Government has been as proactive in its
establishment of its own future act regime with State legislation as is possible
under the NTA.The experience of the Western Australian and South Australian
Governments confirms that it is possible for a State Government regime to deal
with all s29 notices post-Wik.
The Western Australian Government was equally careful to use tenure
histories where 'a proposed mining title reveals grants that may not be
inconsistent with the continued existence of native title, such as pastoral leases
issued with a reservation in favour of Aboriginal people' (NNTT 1995: 52). This
decision meant that the Western Australian mining industry was in a very
different position from that in Queensland following the Wik decision.
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Post-Wik, the Queensland Government faced a situation where they had
issued 800 potentially invalid leases to mining companies and interests on
pastoral leases after 1 January 1994 and until December 1996.No permissible
future act s29 notifications had accompanied any of these licences or grants of
leases. However, the situation was worse than simply 800 potentially invalid
leases on pastoral land. In a press statement of 31 January 1997 the Queensland
Minister for Mines and Energy, Mr Tom Gilmore MLA, estimated that a total of
4,601 mining tenures had been granted in Queensland after 1 January 1994. The
subsequent freeze over all new applications and grants of renewals for mining and
exploration tenures on non-freehold land was estimated to affect 2,500 tenures in
a full year (Pinnock 1997:1).
To add to the industry's frustrations, the Queensland Government had also
made it clear that on the basis of their legal advice the State could not be
compelled to issue an s29 notice and all applications would be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
Initially, the Queensland Government was not prepared to issue s29 notices
to Union Mining NL. Admittedly, CZL had managed to acquire the necessary
notifications; although in this case too, the Queensland Government had initially
attempted to enable the mine to proceed outside the NTA framework. Indeed, it
was pressure brought by the native title claimants, and later CZL that forced the
State Government to agree to work within the native title legislation and the RTN
process. However, the Century mine, unlike Union Mining NL in Georgetown,
represented a significant resource development prospect in the Gulf Mineral
Province with substantial financial gains to the State in revenue and employment
opportunities. If economic imperatives were the required incentive in the CZLcase
for the State Government to engage with the NTA, by contrast, Union Mining NL
had less economic leverage to exert in their negotiations with the Queensland
Government. Yet in actual terms the company's operations provided 40 jobs in a
remote town of 300 people with few alternative employment opportunities.2
There is some dispute about the exact date of Queensland's issue of the s29
notice to Union Mining NL and consequently of the two-month notification period.
The State Government claims they issued an s29 advertisement before the
administrative freeze was partially lifted on 31 March 1997 (The Courier Mail 18
June 1997).3 Queensland further claims that Union Mining NLsought issue of an
s29 notice on 21 March and that Cabinet approved it on 24 March and the
notices were advertised shortly thereafter.
The importance of the notification date lies in the question of the role of the
two-month notification period as a contributing factor in the closure of the mine.
Union Mining NL simply could not continue because access to ore had been
denied to the company. What leases it had left were of marginal interest given the
low gold prices. The failure of a grant of new leases meant the company would be
forced to operate at a loss if it intended to wait longer on the grant. Some of the
lease applications in question covered ore deposits of better grade. This would
have sustained the operation for some time and possibly through the period of
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downturn in gold prices. However, the losses incurred whilst waiting for action
and the write-down needed upon shutdown, along with limited cash availability
for this project eventually made it impossible for Union Mining NL to reopen the
Georgetown mine. Certainly lower prices impacted on the project's sustainability.
At times of lower prices the company needed access to high grade ore deposits
and without such access the operation could not continue (pers. com. Rob
Murdoch).
What Is certain is that early in 1997 Union Mining NLwas actively seeking a
way to engage with the future act processes under the NTA in order to secure a
valid grant of leases. Indeed, Union Mining NL's correspondence records their
request to Queensland for issue of an s29 notice as early as late February/early
March 1997.4 In the event, the Queensland Government did not issue the notice
until 19 April and this put the end of the two-month notification period at 19
June 1997.
It is equally clear that during the earlier stages of Union Mining NL's
application to government for an s29 notice, that they were actively dissuaded
from involvement with this process. Union Mining NL's management received
clear advice from State bureaucrats that 'as it stands the RTN process is complex,
time consuming and costly'.5 According to a DME spokesperson, the State faces
the logistical problem of applying the RTN process to 500 outstanding
applications, 1,500 new applications and the 1,000 renewals received each year In
Queensland (pers. com.)
To invoke the RTN processes for this number of applications was likely to
cause major administrative problems for the DME and to personnel in the
regional offices. And yet Western Australia was engaging in just such a process
for hundreds of exploration licences and mining leases. The DME has
subsequently estimated the costs of implementing the RTNprocess based on the
expectation of 1,500 application for s29 notices per annum. In their estimate, to
issue these notices would cost Queensland $30 million; companies $60 million,
and an overall administrative procedural cost of $1 million (pers. com. DME; see
Table 1, estimated costing of RTN processes for Western Australia).6
The Queensland State Government had many reasons for actively
discouraging Union Mining NL. The Government was of the view that the future
act process had uncertain outcomes, entailed prohibitive costs and was likely to
be time consuming in the extreme. Indeed, they cited Century mine as a case in
point. The State Government further advised Union Mining NL'smanagement that
what could be learnt from the Western Australian experience was that 'only a
minority of applicants had avoided negotiations, and a backlog has developed
with the remainder for which there have been no successful negotiated outcomes
to date' (files. Union Mining NL March 1997). They estimated that the RTN
processes were delaying projects by at least 14 months. Cabinet's decision to
issue an s29 notice to Union Mining NLwas part of an experiment according to a
DME spokesperson, to 'see if Aboriginal people would lodge claims against small
miners' and not simply against large mining companies.
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Table 1. Estimated RTN processes, Western Australia
Costs Pro-rata
Attributable attributable RTNper
Unit Total costs to RTN to RTN year
$ % $ $
Western Australia
Government, 1995-96
Native Title Unit, Premier & 1,562,000 30.0 468,600
Cabinet
Land Claims Mapping Unit, 269,000 20.0 53,800
WALIS
Dept. of Minerals and Energy 1,750.000 95.0 1,653,000
Dept. of Land Administration 596,000 80.0 472,000
Land Claims Unit, Crown 1,000,000 90.0 900,000
Solicitors Office
Total $3,544,400 $3,544,400
NNTT May 1995 - June 1997
Future Act Unit 2,010,000 100.0 2,010,000
Members assigned to arbitral 310,000 100.0 310,000
matters
Total $2,320,000 $1,160,000
Total annual costs to Western
Australia Government and $4,700,000
NNTT
During research for this paper an official from DME confirmed the State
Government's view of the unworkability of the RTNprocess. The official referred to
the situation in Western Australia as the benchmark of workability. According to
their understanding only two applications of the RTN process had 'come to
fruition out of a total of 4,000 applications in Western Australia'.
Such claims should be scrutinised against data compiled by the NNTT's
Future Act Unit which operates specifically to deal with s29 processes in Western
Australia. As of 24 July 1997 the NNTT had received 9,948 exploration licences
and mining tenement applications from Western Australia. Only 672 of these
applications were involved in further negotiations (see Table 1). In short, the
objections raised by Queensland for not using the s29 process on the basis of
Western Australia's experience are not fully informed. Certainly, there are
transaction costs associated with the NTA, but there are little data to confirm that
independent of strategic behaviour they would be unreasonable or exorbitant (see
Altman 1995; Industry Commission 1996).
The Queensland Government, in response to the clamour for action from
resource developers over their refusal to process renewals, extensions or new
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issues of mining leases and exploration licences, proposed a two-tiered system of
indemnity insurance to recover the administrative costs of processing the
expected avalanche of s29 notices. As reported in The Australian (11 March 1997)
the Queensland Government proposed a two-tier system not only to recover the
administrative costs of processing s29 notices, but also to deal with possible
compensation payments where companies engaged in future acts outside the
native title processes. In the first tier, Government proposed that large mining
companies would make a financial contribution from their profits to cost recovery
and in the second tier, the State Government would provide the necessary funds
to cover pastoralists' costs associated with future acts.
The Government further proposed a 'risk assessment1 scheme (high,
medium or low risk) based on the likelihood of a native title claim being lodged
over land where companies had interests (Queensland Mining Council Circular,
14 March 1997). Five risk categories were identified with low risk areas
comprising freehold/reserves and well developed agricultural land; medium risks
in cleared land (developed and unused) and vacant Crown land; and finally, high
risk categories of vacant Crown land and areas under claim.7 Needless to say,
industry groups were not impressed by such a scheme. Nor did it provide
resolution for the small mining companies and individual miners.
Other options to facilitate a 'permissible future act1
A non-claimant application
Queensland suggested Union Mining NL lodge a non-claimant application
instead of seeking Government issue of an s29 notice. A non-claimant application
seeking a determination of native title for a particular area of land can be lodged
by 'Commonwealth, State, Territory Governments, local government authorities or
persons who hold an interest in land or waters' (NNTT 1995:46). However, in
practice, this was not a realistic or workable solution as the State, not Union
Mining NL, was the lease holder and so the State had to lodge the application for
a determination. A further possibility for Union Mining NLwas an agreement with
the native title claimants under s21 of the NTA.No mention was made to them of
Government being able to seek, on their behalf, an 'expedited procedure'.
s2l agreements
It is apparent that as early as March 1997,Queensland was prepared to
issue new mining tenements where companies had secured agreements with
Aboriginal native title parties by going outside the framework of the RTN
processes. These leases, however, would be considered 'high risk' arrangements
and were likely to attract the penalties of the indemnity scheme and potentially
also attract later claims for compensation by native title claimants. Presumably,
these agreements could be made under s21 of the NTA to authorise future acts or
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they could be made entirely outside the NTA (with the potential of being legally
invalid and in the future, subject to compensation claims from claimants).
However, as early as January 1997 Union Mining NL was aware of the
impending high risk situation with respect to future production rates if new
leases were not forthcoming. Unless it was possible to gain a grant of mining
leases over the deposits in the vicinity of the mine the company would have to
either concentrate on exploration outside Australia or shutdown the Georgetown
plant. Time was of the essence for the viability of the Georgetown mine.
Consequently, from January 1997 onwards the company began lobbying the State
Government for an s29 notice.
Early in the State's administrative freeze, Union Mining NL began to
independently seek negotiations with Aboriginal interests. After the s29 notice
was issued, the Ewamian peoples lodged an application with the NNTT for a
determination of native title over land in the Georgetown area. Union Mining NL
then turned its attention to the possibility of making an agreement with the
Ewamian peoples through their Native Title Representative Body, the North
Queensland Land Council. A draft agreement was developed and redeveloped
during June and July. Ewamian peoples were not opposed to Union Mining NL's
continued activity and were happy to expedite a grant of the leases through a s21
agreement. In return, they wanted a financial package, guarantees of site
protection issues, employment and training opportunities and the Queensland
Government as well as Union Mining NL to be signatories; as is required for
ratification under s21 agreements.
It is possible that the option of pursuing an s21 agreement was flawed from
the beginning. Industry has recognised the value of s21 agreements as
alternatives to the RTN process and as 'framework' agreements to establish
agreements on a local or regional basis. The Cape York Heads of Agreement is
often held up as a model of what is possible. However, a draft report from the
Industry Commission (1995) spelt out the pitfalls from industries' point of view in
the present legislation on regional agreements.
• First, they do not appear to be any different from normal contracts.
• Second, their effectiveness depends on ensuring that all interested parties
are engaged in negotiations at an early stage. Otherwise, an agreement
among some of the parties may need to be renegotiated to accommodate
others. It appears that to be authorised under the NTA, the agreements may
only be struck between native title holders and governments. However, the
NNTT has argued that the parties can include claimants and beneficiaries of
a future act such as mining companies (French 1995: 16-17).
• Third, it is difficult to see how agreements struck between peak bodies (such
as the Cape York agreement) can be used to ensure compliance by
individual members.
• Fourthly, like any agreement, they cannot be enforced against third parties
(Industry Commission 1995: 227).
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Union Mining NL was aware of the lack of legal certainty involved in such
agreements especially if the State was unprepared to be a signatory. Of primary
concern was the impossibility of guaranteeing that at some time in the future
other claimants might not suddenly appear and question the validity of the
original agreement. Agreements under s21 may not be as legally secure as the s29
processes. Smith confirms this possibility: '... grantee and government parties are
assured that the outcome of the right to negotiate is a legally valid future act,
regardless of the eventual native title status of the claimants. Once done, a future
act cannot be made invalid by later claims over the same land. To that extent, the
right to negotiate as it currently stands provides significant certainty about the
legal validity of future acts' (Smith 1996: 11).
This was the kind of certainty Union Mining NLwas seeking. Such certainty
was not guaranteed under s21 agreements despite its potential to short-circuit
the lengthy period for s29 negotiations. But the gains and losses of each process
would have to be carefully assessed by industry.
A further flaw of s21 agreements was the lack of an articulated process for
registering such an agreement under the NTA. This meant any agreements struck
between parties would not be legally binding against other (third) parties. Nor
would it circumvent the possibility of future overlapping claims from other groups
claiming interests in the land in question. Despite these caveats, Union Mining
NL's management continued to pursue an agreement, in the belief that securing
an agreement with the local Aboriginal groups in Georgetown (Ewamian peoples)
would circumvent the statutory processes with the mandatory s29 time frames for
notification, negotiation and/or arbitration.
What Union Mining NL management was working towards between January
and June 1997 were the options available to them for a speedy resolution of the
impasse over the future act processes under the Queensland administrative
freeze. The marginality of the Georgetown operation made progression of the
matter urgent since a small company could ill afford loss of production. However,
it was also clear to Union Mining NL's management as early as April 1997 that
the mine would have to close given the lengthy delays resulting from the
Government's freeze, and as the company saw it 'the time involved with the NTA
negotiations' and the impact on stand-down time for the plant.8 The company had
to made a strategic decision in the context of their overall exploration and
Investment plans. These concerns were the primary basis for the decision to close
the Georgetown mine; at least this is the view taken by the North Queensland
Land Council in their media release on the mine's closure. The release states, The
North Queensland Land Council stresses that the closure of the mine was not the
result of any action taken by the traditional owners but an economic decision by
Union Mining' (North Queensland Land Council Aboriginal Corporation 1997).
Union Mining NL management concurred with this view. In an article about
the closure in The Courier Mail (18 June 1997) the company's managing director
'blamed the State Government's freeze on issuing mining leases in the first three
months of this year as the reason for the shutdown. He said the State
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Government froze applications after the High Court Wik judgement on December
23, 1996,and refused to issue section 29 notices under the CommonwealthAct
which may have enabled mining permits to be approved.... for four months we
weren't allowed to deal with the federal Act'.
The Queensland Government's story of their relationships with Union
Mining NL argues a different sets of claims; notably that the Government issued
an s29 notice before the freeze was partially lifted on 31 March. This assertion
does not seem to conform with the subsequent timetable where the end of the
notification period for the s29 notice was June 19, thereby making the initial
notification two months previously (that is, 19 April).
The State Government also claimed Union Mining NLwas in breach of some
of its security deposits for environmental rehabilitation and that this had resulted
in a hold up of the future act process. Union Mining NL states that to their
knowledge there were no problems in this regard at the time of the Wikjudgement
nor subsequent to it. Yet the wider issues of environmental rehabilitation and
management with the Queensland mining industry has been subject to public
criticism and calls for greater scrutiny of departmental procedures following a
series of revelations in The Courier Mail. In April, The Courier Mail reported that
'Crown law advi[ses] that two-thirds of the security deposits held by the Mines
Department to ensure the rehabilitation of mine sites were worthless and did not
conform with the [Queensland] Mineral Resources Act [1989]' (seeThe Courier
Mail 12 April 1997).
In a war of administrative hurdles and political tactics over future act
notices and the NTA in general in Queensland, all parties—the mining industry,
Aboriginal people and the State Government—seemed to have lost out. The
fluctuations in the price of gold will certainly impact on the viability of exploration
in Queensland. Michael Pinnock, Executive Director of the Queensland Mining
Council, observed 'the falling price of gold would have a significant impact on
exploration in Queensland' (Canberra Times 9 July 1997). Clearly, it would have
been in Queensland's best interests to facilitate Union Mining NL's use of the
NTA, rather than obstruct their use of it since the company has now closed its
mine, cancelled the employment of 40 people at the site and arguably has
diminished the opportunity to work successfully with native title claimants to
facilitate mining. Moreover, Queensland has lost investment potential with the
decision by Union Mining NL management to concentrate on exploration outside
Australia and possibly served to dissuade other small mining companies. The
magnitude of the State's loss is relative however as 'work is proceeding on the
Mount Isa gas pipeline, the $350 million Ernest Henry copper-gold mine and
BHP's $450 million Cannington base metals mine' (The Courier Mail 19 April
1997). Although Queensland has major resource development projects they also
have a large number of smaller scale miners and mining interests whose value the
State may gauge in political, rather than economic, terms.
Altman (1995) discusses the options for strategic behaviour in the field of
resource development with the associated risk-assessment strategies for industry.
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government, and indigenous parties in dealing, or not, with the NTA. In his view
'there is a possibility that delays in negotiation, under the guise of strategic
behaviour, will have real long-term costs. Because past acts have been validated
and renewals guaranteed, there is no evident downturn in exploration and mining
since the Mabo High Court judgement (Australian Mining Industry Council
1994).9 But even normal processing of exploration licence applications has a long
lead time, varying between States from one to three years. If exploration licences
are not processed then there is a distinct possibility that there will be a hiatus in
resource development in the future: mining and, to a lesser degree the petroleum
industry (and ultimately the Australian economy) will suffer, but it is unclear if it
is the NTA that will be at fault. The costs of this strategic behaviour will be most
acutely felt by small exploration and mining interests unless they move quickly to
negotiate with native title parties under the NTA's future acts regime: large
companies will be at greater liberty to shift their focus offshore' (Altman 1995:
10).
This critique goes to the heart of the issues facing Union Mining NL'suse of
the s29 future act processes at Georgetown.
Conclusions
To date. Union Mining NL is one of only two mining companies in Queensland to
secure State Cabinet approval for issue of an s29 permissible future act notice.
Union Mining NL stands by way of contrast in industry scale with the other
company (CZL) which secured s29 notices for the future acts process.
Union Mining NL is a smaller company than CZL with essentially an
exploration focus. As a company it lobbied governments independently of an
industry representative such as the Queensland Mining Council and single-
handedly agitated for access to the future acts process and to encourage changes
to the NTA.Few, if any other resource developers in Queensland have followed the
trail that they blazed. Most have preferred, like the Queensland Government
itself, to wait for Commonwealth amendments to the NTA and/or the introduction
of a State alternative future act regime. Importantly,Union Mining NL's initiatives
and preparedness to negotiate gained positive responses from Aboriginal
claimants.
Union Mining NL's success in gaining access to the RTN process is
testament to the energies of the company's management who pursued the issue at
State and Federal levels of Government. Why the Queensland Cabinet decided in
their favour is not exactly clear. In some quarters it was suggested that approval
was given as an experiment to test the waters on how small resource developers
might fare under native title claims and the RTNprocess and whether it was only
the larger companies and their capacity for compensation which were attractive to
potential native title claimants, bearing in mind the 800 or so potentially invalid
leases that were issued.
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The Union Mining NL case confirms the incentive, even in small-scale
operations, for industry to work within legislative processes which ensure legal
certainties. Indeed, one of the frustrations of their experience was the refusal of
the State Government to abide by the due processes of the NTA and, as Union
Mining NL argues, the State Government's duty of care to implement due
legislative processes. Time was a critical factor in the economic viability of Union
Mining NL's operation.
However, it is equally clear that mining operations differ and that operations
smaller than Union Mining NL may not be as fully informed or as responsive to
the issues of negotiation and consultation with claimant parties as are many
larger companies now.10 Increasingly, for all parties, there is a strategic advantage
in becoming familiar with the native title legislation and its specific application to
the particular resource industry. Large companies are often at an advantage over
small companies and individual miners, in respect to access to assistance from
peak industry bodies and with representation of their concerns in state and
national forums. Union Mining NLliaised with the peak industry body during the
time they sought issue of an s29 notification but the Queensland Mining Council
did not feel able to directly assist the company other than to provide moral
support.
Large companies appreciate the importance of full knowledge of legislative
processes like the NTAand their need to engage with it to minimise potential
impacts on production strategies (see Altaian 1995). While large corporations
might have greater flexibility in what can be offered or packaged as agreements
and compensation incentives, it is also true that smaller companies of Union
Mining NL's size will have to adjust their expectations when dealing with native
title claimants and their representatives; and vice versa.
For native title claimants and representative bodies, working with smaller
industry bodies may require different strategies to those more familiar with
engagement with multi-national companies. Marginal operations may have limited
cash resources on which to cover the financial costs involved in negotiations and
on which to forge agreements, but may be willing to expand their options in other
arenas, for example, access to infrastructure; training and human resources
programs; joint ventures; preferential service contracts. It may also be in the
interests of all parties to adopt a strategic process for expediting procedures for
small mining companies through potential regional agreements in prospective
areas; a case in point is the recently concluded regional agreement between 14
mining companies and Aboriginal native title groups in South Australia (the new
body is known as the Far West Coast Working Group).11 What this case study
shows is that it has not been in the best interests of either the Ewamian peoples
or Union Mining NL to have the mine close at Georgetown.
In an Australian Journal of Mining editorial the issue of sovereign risk in
Australia for overseas investment was discussed in terms of the impact of the
NTA. Mr Jerry Ellis, President of the Minerals Council of Australia made these
comments: 'While it is too early to quantify native title considerations as part of
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the cost of land access, the uncertainty and delay inherent in the current native
title procedures are resulting in deferral of expenditure or the switching of
investment to areas where the procedures of the Native Title Act do not apply'
(Ellis 1997: 4). This paper suggests that State Governments can play a
substantial role themselves in either exacerbating such delays, or ameliorating
them.
The experience of Union Mining NL indicates a point endorsed by other
resources developers; in part it is up to the industry itself to overcome delays and
it requires a willingness to negotiate, to maintain a relationship with Aboriginal
people and generally to work with the requirements of the native title legislation
(not withstanding the proviso of certain amendments). Also Native Title
Representative Bodies and claimants must be aware of the different degrees of
flexibility in negotiations between large and small companies.
Two points have potential policy significance. One is that the Federal
Government's 'once only' amendment of present RTN procedure over exploration
and mining may in fact be counterproductive in terms of workability. Father
Frank Brennan SJ made this point in evidence to the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land
Fund regarding the Native Title Amendment Bill 1996. In his view, by collapsing
negotiations for exploration with project development one invited claimants to
think in terms of 'mega-negotiations'. Exploration was likely to be challenged
since the 'one-stop' RTNprocess could not only make seeking instructions from
native title claimants difficult with all project phases jammed together but 'create
a situation where you set up an expectation, particularly among Aboriginal
claimants, that any prospective exploration could be a 'Century Zinc' at the end of
the process' (Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 24; see also remarks by the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Dodson
(Dodson 1996)). A caveat on the virtue of offering the RTN at exploration in
Altaian's view is that native title claimants come to expect a 'sweetener' that small
companies often cannot afford (Altaian 1995).
The tendency for both claimant parties and State Governments to think of
extractive industries as an homogenous body already exists; in a recent survey of
30 Western Australian mining companies concern existed that 'precedent setting,
Aboriginal financial expectations and inexperience on both sides in reaching such
agreements have hampered the process' (Industry Commission 1996: 228).
Michael Pinnock, Executive Director of the Queensland Minerals Council
argues that There is a willingness among our companies—admittedly, mostly the
middle-sized and larger operations—to negotiate commercial and social packages
which will enable projects to proceed' (The Courier Mail 30 May 1997).12 Equally,
all companies have to realise that a reasonable offer will be necessary as
restitution for loss of access or enjoyment of land, damage to cultural property
and curtailment of customary practice, or impingement on spiritual attachment.
The issue of compensation and how this is to be assessed is currently untested.
But there is every indication that in the constitutional pursuit of 'just terms,' like
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the above, compensation will be integrated into how native title holders are
assessed.
The second policy issue is the 'Big Picture1 question raised by this case
study; how to facilitate the projects of smaller companies and what combination
of packaging for social and economic benefits to the native title parties might be
proposed in return for fast-track RTN procedures? In States like Queensland and
Western Australia, the issue of future act processes will impact significantly on
this smaller-scale sector of the mining industry.13 One solution might be to
develop different administrative processes both at the State departmental level,
and under the NTA, to deal specifically with different industry sectors.14 Another
might be the regional agreements process (see Howitt 1997). From the mining
industry's perspective it is increasingly clear that government in Australia needs
to sponsor a more proactive approach to industry development; for miners, this is
not confined to issues of native title (see articles by J. Webber The Australian, 18
August 1997 p. 18; and D. Kirkwood Business Queensland, 4 August 1997 p.8).
It remains to be seen whether these and other issues raised by the case
study will be addressed by the detail of the Federal Coalition Government's bill of
amendments to the Native Title Act 1993.
Notes
1. The Western Australian Government's strategy was to flood the NNTT and clog the
system.
2. Union Mining NL pointed out that their mining operation was the principal employer
in Georgetown and contributed approximately $1.5 million to the local economy with a
loss, after the closure of the mine, to the State and Federal Governments of over $1
million in revenue and taxes.
3. Premier Borbidge announced a partial lift of the freeze on 13 March 1997— this is the
date quoted by Mr Michael Pinnock, Executive Officer, Queensland Mining Council, to
the Working with Native Title Conference, Brisbane, 16-18 June 1997.
4. These dates are confirmed by Union Mining NL management's acknowledgment that
by January 1997 they recognised their three options as:
a) using political pressure to lift the administrative freeze;
b) convincing the Queensland Cabinet to issue a s29 notice no later than the end of
February 1997;
c) reaching agreement with potential native title holders through the North
Queensland Land Council (see paper presented by Mr Rob Murdoch to the
Working with Native Title Conference, Brisbane, 16-18 June 1997).
5. Compare this with details from Western Australia provided to the Industry
Commission on mining tenement applications subjected to the RTN process or
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expedited procedure between 16 March 1995and 2 August 1996(Industry
Commission 1996: 214).
6. Unfortunately, no details were provided for such an estimate; although presumably
some of this costing is linked to the two-tier indemnity system proposed by the
Queensland Government. See also an article by Don Kirkwood in Business
Queensland 4 August 1997 about current Queensland Government policy with respect
to the RTN process and the Government's decision not to fund extra staff in the DME
to facilitate native title matters.
7. See details discussed in a paper presented by Mr Michael Pinnock, Executive Officer,
Queensland Mining Council, to the Working with Native Title Conference, Brisbane,
16-18 June 1997.
8. The company has pointed out that they did not find the NTA per se a problem. The
problem was the time involved in the whole process (pers. com. Rob Murdoch).
9. The Industry Commission Report (Industry Commission 1996) and the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission Commissioner Dodson (Dodson 1996) concur
with this conclusion.
10. Some estimates by peak mining industry bodies in Queensland suggest that in Far
North Queensland alone, there are at least 200 family mining operations working on
4,000 mining leases. Although these mining operations are small in terms of total
State production they often have economic significance for the region in which they
operate. Moreover, it is standard practice for prospecting to open the gateway to
mining, since once a deposit is identified on a prospecting or exploration licence it is
then traded through the competitive market place to companies with the financial
capacity to mine the deposit.
11. See D. Frith, The Australian, August 19, 1997 p. 24.
12. See also results of survey of 30 mining companies in Western Australia on responses
to NTA reported in Industry Commission Report 1996: 228.
13. The Queensland Mining Council estimates that in Far North Queensland alone, about
200 small family miners operate on about 4,000 mining leases. These are short-term
leases covering small areas. The sector has a high turn over of renewals and transfers
essential to the nature of their exploration and extraction activity.
14. One solution may be to develop a standard administrative process for classes of
activities as occurs in other areas in law such as conveyancing or building contracts.
The point is to develop an administrative process which takes the controversy out of
it; perhaps the experience of the land councils in the Northern Territory should be
examined for issues of workability in exploration and project development (see
Industry Commission 1996: 217-18).
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 139 19
References
Altman, J.C. 1995. 'Native Title Act 1993: Implementation issues for resource developers',
Discussion Paper No. 88, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The
Australian National University, Canberra.
Aboriginal and Torrest Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 1996. Proposed Amendments to
the Native Title Act 1993: Issues Jo Indigenous Peoples, Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Aboriginal and Torrest Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 1997. The Ten Point Plan on Wik
and Native Title: Issues for Indigenous Peoples, ATSIC, Canberra.
Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC) 1994. "The impact of the Commonwealth Native
Title Act 1993 on exploration in Australia1, Appendix 4, Mineral Industry Survey '94,
AMIC, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia 1996. The Sixth Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund. The Native Title
Amendment Bill 1996, Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra.
Dodson, M. (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner) 1996.
Native Title Report, July 1995-June 1996, Report of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner to the Attorney-General, Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra.
Ellis, J. 1997. 'Editorial', Australian Journal of Mining, February: 4.
French, R. 1995 [quoted in Industry Commission 1996]. The Implications for Australia of
Firms Locating Offshore, (draft report) Industry Commission, Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra.
Howitt, R. 1997. "The other side of the negotiating table: corporate culture and negotiating
with resource companies', Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, Native Titles
Research Unit, Regional Agreements Paper no. 3, Australian Institute of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Canberra.
Industry Commission 1995. The Implications for Australia of Firms Locating Offshore, (draft
report) Industry Commission, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Industry Commission 1996. The Implications for Australia of Firms Locating Offshore,
Industry Commission, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
National Farmers Federation 1997. 'NFF says Wik legislation needs amending to end
uncertainty', media release, 4 September 1997.
National Native Title Tribunal 1995. National Native Title Tribunal 1994/5 Annual Report,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
North Queensland Land Council Aboriginal Corporation 1997. 'Re: closure of Union
Mining's Georgetown operations', media release 20 June 1997.
Pinnock, M. 1997. 'Validation of mining leases and exploration licences granted since
1994—the implications of frozen leases on the Industry', paper presented to the
Working with Native Title Act Conference, Brisbane, 16-18 June 1997.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
FINLAYSON
Smith, D.E. 1996. 'The right to negotiate and native title future acts: implications of the
Native Title Amendment Bill 1996', Discussion Paper No. 124. Centre forAboriginal
Economic Policy Research, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Union Mining NL 1996. Annual Report, Brisbane.
Union Mining NL 1997. Report to the Australian Stock Exchange Ltd.Highlights for the
March 1997 Quarter, Brisbane.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
For information on earlier CAEPR Discussion Papers and Research
Monographs please contact:
Publication Sales
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
Faculty of Arts
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
Telephone: 02 - 6279 8211
Facsimile: 02 - 6249 2789
Abstracts or Summaries of all CAEPR Publications
can be found at the following WWW address:
http://online.anu.edu/caepr/
MONOGRAPH SERIES
1. Aborigines in the Economy: A Select Annotated Bibliography of Policy-Relevant Research
1985-90, L.M. Allen, J.C. Altman and E. Owen (with assistance from W.S. Arthur),
1991.
2. Aboriginal Employment Equity by the Year 2000, J.C. Altman (ed.), published for the
Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 1991.
3. A National Survey of Indigenous Australians: Options and Implications,
J.C. Altman (ed.), 1992.
4. Indigenous Australians in the Economy: Abstracts of Research, 1991-92,
L.M. Roach and K.A. Probst, 1993.
5. The Relative Economic Status of Indigenous Australians, 1986-91, J. Taylor, 1993.
6. Regional Change in the Economic Status of Indigenous Australians, 1986-91,
J. Taylor, 1993.
7. Mabo and Native Title: Origins and Institutional Implications, W. Sanders (ed.), 1994.
8. The Housing Need of Indigenous Australians, 1991, R. Jones, 1994.
9. Indigenous Australians in the Economy: Abstracts of Research, 1993-94,
L.M. Roach and H.J. Bek, 1995.
10. The Native Title Era: Emerging Issues for Research, Policy and Practice,
J. Finlayson and D.E. Smith (eds), 1995.
11. The 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey: Findings and Future
Prospects, J.C. Altman and J. Taylor (eds), 1996.
12. Fighting Over Country: Anthropological Perspectives, D.E. Smith and
J. Finlayson (eds), 1997.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
RECENT DISCUSSION PAPERS
103/1996 Policy implications of rising Aboriginal fertility in the early 1990s, H.
Tesfaghiorghis
1O4/1996 Change in the relative occupational status of Indigenous workers,
1986-91, J. Taylor and J. Liu.
105/1996 Reforming financial aspects of the Native Title Act 1993: an economics
perspective, J.C. Altaian.
106/1996 Indigenous Australians and the socioeconomic status of urban
neighbourhoods, B. Hunter.
107/1996 The comparative economic status of CDEP and non-CDEP community
residents in the Northern Territory in 1991, J.C. Altman and
B. Hunter.
108/1996 Indigenous participation in labour market and training programs,
J. Taylor and B. Hunter.
109/1996 The economic status of Indigenous Australian households: a statistical
and ethnographic analysis. D.E. Smith and A.E. Daly.
110/1996 Income poverty among Indigenous families with children: estimates
from the 1991 Census, R.T. Ross and A. Mikalauskas.
111/1996 Having it 'both ways': the continuing complexities of community -
controlled Indigenous education, R.G. Schwab.
112/1996 The geographic distribution of unemployment-related benefits and
CDEP scheme employment. J.C. Altman and B. Hunter.
113/1996 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development
Corporation: a new approach to enterprise?, W.S. Arthur.
114/1996 CDEP as urban enterprise: the case ofYamteen Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islanders Corporation, Newcastle, D.E. Smith.
115/1996 The determinants of Indigenous employment outcomes: the importance
of education and training, B. Hunter.
116/1996 Linking accountability and self-determination in Aboriginal
organisations, D.F. Martin and J.D. Finlayson.
117/1996 Aboriginal health and institutional reform within Australian federalism,
I. Anderson and W. Sanders.
118/1996 Short-term Indigenous population mobility and service delivery,
J. Taylor.
119/1996 Indigenous labour force status to the year 2000: estimated impacts of
recent Budget cuts, B. Hunter and J. Taylor.
120/1996 Community inuoluemenf in education: an exploration of American
Indian education policy and implications for Australia, R.G. Schwab.
121/1996 Towards greater autonomy for Torres Strait: political and economic
dimensions, J.C. Altman, W.S. Arthur and W. Sanders.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H
122/1996 Indigenous participation in higher education: culture, choice and
human capital theory, R.G. Schwab.
123/1996 Estimating the social rate of return to education for Indigenous
Australians, P.M. Junankar and J. Liu.
124/1996 The right to negotiate and native title future acts: implications of the
Native Title Amendment Bill 1996, D.E. Smith.
125/1996 Native title and the petroleum industry: recent developments, options,
risks and strategic choices, J.C. Altman
126/1996 Aboriginal economic development and land rights in the Northern
Territory: past performance, current issues and strategic options, J.C.
Altman.
127/1997 Indigenous poverty since the Henderson Report, J.C. Altman and
B. Hunter.
128/1997 The opportunity costs of future Indigenous labour force status,
J. Taylor.
129/1997 Native Title Representative Bodies: the challenge of strategic planning,
J. Finlayson.
13O/1997 The potential impact of the Workplace Relations and other Legislation
Amendment Act 1996 on Indigenous employees, B. Hunter.
131/1997 Post-compulsory education and training for Indigenous Australians,
R.G. Schwab.
132/1997 A Torres Strait Islanders Commission? Possibilities and issues,
W. Sanders and W.S. Arthur.
133/1997 Service provision and service providers in a remote Queensland
Community, J.D. Finlayson.
134/1997 Indigenous sole parent families: invisible and disadvantaged,
A.E. Daly and D.E. Smith.
135/1997 Utilisation of native wildlife by indigenous Australians: commercial
considerations, J.C. Altman, L.M. Roach and L.E. Liddle.
136/1997 The interrelationships between arrest and employment: more evidence
on the social determinants of indigenous employment, B. Hunter and
J. Borland.
137/1997 A profile of indigenous workers in the private sector, J. Taylor and
B. Hunter.
138/1997 Indigenous TAPE graduates: patterns and implications, R.G. Schwab
139/1997 The right to negotiate and the miner's right: a case study of native title
future act processes in Queensland, J.D. Finlayson.
14O/1997 The future shape ofABSTUDY: practical and policy implications of the
recent proposed changes, R.G. Schwab and S.F. Campbell.
141/1997 Opportunities and problems astride the welfare/work divide: the CDEP
scheme in Australian social policy, W. Sanders.
C E N T R E F O R A B O R I G I N A L E C O N O M I C P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H





